Summary: Wildfires can disrupt far more than the assets directly exposed to fire. Because electricity, telecommunications, water, transport and essential services depend on one another, an interruption in one system can spread into others—affecting business continuity, emergency coordination, community access and the speed at which connected services can recover.
Key takeaways
- Wildfires can create cascading disruption when electricity, communications, transport, water and other essential services depend on one another.
- Protecting individual assets remains necessary, but resilience also requires organisations to understand cross-system dependencies.
- Infrastructure disruption may continue after the fire front passes because access, restoration and service recovery are interconnected.
- Early detection and operational wildfire intelligence can support earlier assessment and coordination, but they are only part of a wider resilience system.
A wildfire does not have to destroy every critical asset to create an infrastructure crisis.
During Australia’s Black Summer, damage to electricity networks contributed to telecommunications outages. When mobile services failed, some ATMs and EFTPOS terminals also lost connectivity. This made it harder for people to buy the fuel they needed to evacuate.
A fire affecting one system had begun to disrupt several others. This is the defining feature of an infrastructure crisis: the consequences travel through connections.
Electricity supports communications. Communications support warnings, operational coordination and digital payments. Roads provide access for emergency services, repair crews, fuel deliveries and community evacuation. Water infrastructure may depend on power, telecommunications, transport and specialist supplies.
When one service is interrupted, the effects can move into systems that were never directly touched by fire.
Understanding those dependencies is the point at which wildfire stops being viewed solely as a threat to individual assets and starts being managed as a potential systems crisis.
Critical infrastructure is a network
Critical infrastructure is often divided into sectors: energy, communications, water, transport, healthcare, food, financial services and government.
These categories are useful, but infrastructure does not operate in isolation. An organisation may work within one sector while depending heavily on services controlled by several others.
A telecommunications facility may require grid electricity, backup fuel delivered by road, remote access through digital systems and technicians who can safely reach the site.
A water-treatment facility may depend on electricity for pumping and treatment, telecommunications for monitoring and control, transport for chemicals and replacement equipment, and functioning supply chains for specialist parts.
Emergency services need roads, fuel, communications, electricity and current information. Regional businesses may require all these services as well as internet connectivity and payment systems.
Protecting individual substations, telecommunications towers, water facilities, roads and other assets remains essential. Asset-level planning is a necessary part of resilience, but it may not capture every cross-system dependency that determines whether a service can continue operating.
The broader question is:
What does this asset depend on, who depends on it, and what happens if several connected services are disrupted at the same time?
How can wildfire cause cascading infrastructure failures?
Infrastructure dependencies take several forms. Understanding them helps organisations identify consequences that may not appear in an assessment of direct fire exposure.
Physical dependencies
Some services require the physical output of another infrastructure system.
Telecommunications equipment requires electricity. Water treatment and distribution may require power. Fuel stations need electricity to operate pumps and payment systems. Backup generators require fuel.
If the supporting service is interrupted, the dependent service may also fail—even when its own infrastructure remains undamaged.
Infrastructure Australia documented this pattern during the 2019–20 bushfires. Of 888 telecommunications outages examined between December 2019 and January 2020, 779 were attributed to mains-power failures. Telecommunications disruption then affected internet-connected ATMs and EFTPOS terminals, making it harder for some people to purchase fuel required for evacuation.
The consequences travelled from electricity into communications, payments, fuel access and evacuation.
Geographic dependencies
Different infrastructure systems may share the same geographic exposure. Powerlines, communications cables, roads and water infrastructure can follow similar corridors through fire-prone landscapes. Several facilities may rely on the same bridge, access road, transmission route or communications link.
A wildfire, falling vegetation or road closure in one location can therefore affect multiple services at once. Geographic concentration also influences restoration. Even when equipment and crews are available, unsafe conditions or blocked access may prevent them from reaching damaged assets.
AusNet reported that some affected parts of its network could not be accessed safely for weeks after the initial damage.
The operational impact was shaped by both the damage and the ability to reach it.
Operational dependencies
Infrastructure services depend on people, equipment, fuel, contractors, information and access—not only physical assets.
A facility may remain intact but operate below capacity because employees cannot travel safely. Repair teams may be unable to reach the affected area. Replacement equipment may be delayed by transport disruption. Fuel deliveries may be interrupted by road closures.
Organisations may also face simultaneous demand for contractors, communications equipment, generators and specialist personnel when a wildfire affects several regions or networks.
Information dependencies
Infrastructure operators need current information to make and coordinate decisions.
They may need to understand where a fire has been identified, its proximity to critical assets, which services or access routes may be affected and whether field personnel can operate safely.
Communications disruption can make this information harder to obtain and share. Different organisations may also have separate operational pictures, terminology and decision processes.
Information is therefore not merely a supporting resource. It is part of the infrastructure response system.
Economic and community dependencies
Infrastructure disruption can move quickly into households, businesses and regional economies.
A power outage may interrupt refrigeration, telecommunications, water pumping, fuel access and electronic payments. Road closures can prevent workers, customers and supplies from reaching businesses. Communications failures can affect warnings, family contact and commercial operations.
The effects may extend beyond the fire perimeter through interrupted supply chains, restricted access, service outages and smoke-related disruption. The impact of infrastructure failure therefore includes more than asset-repair costs. It can include interrupted services, lost income and increased pressure on affected communities.
Why can an infrastructure crisis continue after the fire front passes?
Visible damage is only the first layer of an infrastructure event.
Operators may need to inspect extensive networks before restoring services. Access may remain unsafe. Replacement equipment may be scarce. Temporary systems may require continuing fuel and staff. Customers may need additional assistance while repairs proceed.
Secondary hazards can create further disruption. Rain on burnt terrain may trigger erosion, debris flows or water contamination. Smoke may continue affecting communities and workforces. Damaged vegetation can create new risks to roads and powerlines.
Recovery may also need to follow a particular sequence.
Restoring electricity can help communications, water systems, fuel stations and businesses resume operation. Clearing a road may allow power or telecommunications crews to reach damaged infrastructure. Restoring communications can improve coordination across other recovery activities.
Infrastructure recovery is therefore not simply a collection of independent repair jobs. It is a connected operational process.
Why infrastructure dependencies are hard to see
Infrastructure networks are managed by different organisations with different responsibilities, information systems and planning cycles.
A dependency that becomes obvious during an emergency may be less visible during routine planning.
For example, an organisation may have backup power but still need to consider:
- how long it can operate;
- how replacement fuel would arrive if roads were closed;
- whether staff could reach the site;
- whether the backup system requires telecommunications;
- whether several facilities would require refuelling simultaneously; and
- whether the fuel supplier has its own infrastructure dependencies.
Each arrangement may be reasonable when considered separately. The additional exposure becomes visible when the connections are examined together.
A 2026 systematic review found that wildfire infrastructure research has concentrated largely on electricity and water. It identified comparatively limited consideration of infrastructure interdependencies and non-flame hazards such as smoke and firebrands. The authors called for greater cross-sector collaboration and proactive adaptation planning.
Infrastructure Australia has similarly recommended an all-hazards, systemic approach that considers assets, networks, systems, places and communities. It argues that identifying and communicating interdependencies before, during and after disruption is critical to managing systemic vulnerability.
The objective is not to predict every possible chain of events. It is to understand the most consequential dependencies before they are tested under pressure.
What should organisations ask before a fire?
A systems view begins by tracing what each critical service requires and what could follow if it became unavailable.
Useful questions include:
- Which external services are essential to our critical operations, and who depends on the services we provide?
- Where do multiple infrastructure systems share the same geographic exposure?
- What happens if electricity, communications and road access are disrupted together?
- How long can backup arrangements operate independently?
- Do those arrangements depend on fuel, connectivity, contractors or physical access?
- Which suppliers or services represent potential single points of dependency?
- How will we obtain and share information if normal communications are unavailable?
- Which services should be restored first to enable wider recovery?
- Are these dependencies reflected in continuity plans, exercises and agreements?
These questions can reveal where resilience depends on coordination rather than one organisation acting alone. They also help distinguish between possessing a backup asset and maintaining a workable continuity capability.
What do operators need to know during a developing fire?
During a developing incident, the practical challenge is to answer a series of operational questions:
- Has a potential fire been identified?
- Where is it in relation to critical assets and access routes?
- Which operations or dependencies could be affected?
- Is there enough information to investigate or escalate?
- Who needs to receive the information?
- Can field personnel continue operating safely?
- Are conditions or potential consequences changing?
- Do other organisations have information that changes the assessment?
- What action is appropriate within the organisation’s responsibilities?
The value of wildfire information depends on whether it helps people answer these questions with sufficient confidence and time to act.
The question is not simply whether a potential fire can be identified. It is whether the resulting information helps operators understand what may be affected and make appropriate decisions.
How can early detection support infrastructure resilience?
AI-powered early wildfire detection and operational wildfire intelligence cannot make infrastructure resilient on their own.
They do not replace infrastructure hardening, redundancy, vegetation management, backup power, access planning, communications resilience, emergency response or tested continuity arrangements.
Their contribution is more specific.
Earlier awareness may give an organisation additional time to determine whether critical assets, services or access routes could be affected. It may support earlier communication with field personnel, infrastructure partners or emergency services. It may also allow continuity actions to begin before conditions deteriorate.
Operational wildfire intelligence can add useful context. Information about location, proximity, current conditions and relevant assets can help teams assess the relationship between a developing incident and the infrastructure they manage.
This is where exci has a legitimate role.
exci provides AI-powered early wildfire detection and operational wildfire intelligence to support human assessment and decision-making. In an infrastructure context, its role is not to replace the wider resilience system. It is to provide earlier, useful information to the people operating within that system.
The appropriate contribution will depend on the organisation, its assets, its responsibilities and its existing operational arrangements.
Resilience is a shared operational capability
No infrastructure operator controls every system on which it depends.
Electricity providers do not control every road required by repair crews. Telecommunications companies do not control the electricity supply to every facility. Water operators do not control all the communications, transport and supply chains supporting their operations.
Wildfire resilience therefore cannot be achieved entirely within organisational boundaries.
It requires infrastructure owners, emergency services, governments, suppliers and communities to understand where their responsibilities and dependencies intersect.
That understanding should exist before smoke is visible.
A wildfire becomes an infrastructure crisis when disruption moves through the connections between assets, services, organisations and communities. The more clearly those connections are understood, the better organisations can identify weak points, prepare workable alternatives and coordinate decisions when conditions change.
Protecting individual assets matters. Infrastructure resilience depends on the wider system continuing to function.
by Gabrielle Tylor
exci – Early Wildfire Detection & Operational Intelligence
8 September 2026